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Taxing Gains at Death: A Further
Comment
Charles 0. Galvin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Lawrence Zelenak's recent Article provides an excellent
analysis of the relevant issues and their treatment in a tax regime in
which gains and losses are recognized at gifttime and deathtime trans-
fers.' I have argued for the same policy change, suggesting further the
repeal of the wealth transfer tax system altogether and possibly the re-
peal of Section 1022 to require the inclusion in recipients' gross income
of gifts, bequests, devises, and inheritances.' Still further, in agreement
with Professor Zelenak, I would retain the present concepts of the mari-
tal deduction, unlimited charitable deduction for deathtime transfers,
and some minimum exemption that would be indexed for inflation.
II. TAXING GAINS AT DEATH
A. Revenue Concerns
Under present legislative rubrics, any proposed Code amendments
resulting in revenue reductions must be "paid for" with other amend-
ments. The transfer tax system is approximately a twelve billion dollar
revenue gainer.4 Revenue estimates vary on the amount that would re-
sult from taxing net gains on gifttime and deathtime transfers; assume
for purposes of the present discussion that rules could be fashioned to
produce more than twelve billion dollars to offset the revenue loss if the
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wealth transfer tax system were eliminated. 5 Moreover, if Section 102
were repealed, the revenue gains would, of course, be substantially
greater.
B. Why Eliminate the Transfer Tax System?
I have responded in detail to this question elsewhere' and will only
summarize some of my arguments here.
1. The target population to which the wealth transfer tax system
applies is only a miniscule percentage of the total population. Treasury
estimates of wealth holdings in the United States reflect that about one
million people have net assets of one million dollars or more, and many
members of this group can effectively avoid any serious impact of the
wealth transfer tax system.' Even assuming that these numbers are low,
is it really worth the costs of administration, collection, and enforce-
ment to continue a transfer tax system when more effective allocations
of resources could be applied to the income tax system to achieve a
more fair result?
2. Even within the small target population a minimum of effort can
produce opportunities for substantial transfers of wealth without tax.
Indeed, estate planning has developed into a major cottage industry for
tax practitioners and financial advisors, with a surfeit of literature, con-
ferences, and seminars on the subject. A carefully devised program of
lifetime giving, trusts and special powers of appointment, life insurance,
payments to defray the living expenses of younger members of the fam-
ily, private annuities, and a host of other arrangements offer the estate
5. Professor Zelenak cites authority for estimated amounts representing the loss from failure
to tax gains at death. The estimates range from $11.6 billion to $28 billion. Zelenak, 46 Vand. L.
Rev. at 371 & n.44 (cited in note 1).
6. Joseph Pechman stated that "ft]here is little statistical information available on families
who receive gifts or bequests and therefore no reliable basis upon which to allocate either the
assets transferred or the [transfer] taxes collected." Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes,
1966-85? 16 (Brookings Inst., 1985). Earlier estimates indicated that repeal of §102 would add ap-
proximately 3% of adjusted gross income to the taxable base. Commission to Revise the Tax
Structure, Reforming the Federal Tax Structure 154 (Fund for Public Policy Research, 1973).
Assuming that adjusted gross income is between $3 and $4 trillion, the addition of 3% would
produce $90-$120 billion, which taxed at an average rate of 20% would produce $18-$24 billion in
revenue. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1978).
7. Galvin, 52 Tax Notes 1413 (cited in note 3); Galvin, 56 Tax Notes 951 (cited in note 3);
Galvin, 59 Tax Notes 435 (cited in note 3).
8. Treasury estimates reflect that in 1986 about 3.3 million people had gross assets of
$500,000 or more, of which about 1.5 million people had net assets of $500,000 to $1 million. Less
than 1 million had net assets of $1 million or more. Marvin Schwartz and Barry Johnson, Esti-
mates of Personal Wealth, 1986, 9 SOI Bulletin No. 4 at 71 (U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 1990);
U.S. Dep't of Comm. at 464 (cited in note 4). As any student of basic estate tax is aware, a married
couple with $1.2 million in net assets can avoid transfer taxes altogether.
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owner numerous options for tax avoidance. Indeed, one is tempted to
conjecture, perhaps with some cynicism, that support for the wealth
transfer tax system comes principally from the legions of advisors and
practitioners who assist in its avoidance"
3. Among those within the target population, significant differences
in tax consequences can exist between people in similar economic cir-
cumstances; horizontal and vertical equity are lacking. Thus, X may en-
joy an appreciation in value of his portfolio, die, and leave a stepped-up
basis for his heirs.10 Y, on the other hand, may be required by market
forces to convert his portfolio before death, pay the capital gains tax,
and then have his estate taxed again on the remaining accumulation.
Some argue that the estate tax pays for the step up in basis for X; thus,
the tax acts as a kind of toll charge to effect the step up. Y's estate may
pay approximately the same toll charge, however, but without the step-
up advantage because the cost basis and fair market values of Y's port-
folio at his death are roughly equal.1
Consider another example: the couple who leave their estate to an
only child as contrasted with the childless couple who divide their es-
tate among nieces and nephews in straitened financial circumstances.
Each may pay the same estate tax but the amounts received by the
beneficiaries in relation to their respective personal economic conditions
may be quite different.
12
4. If the wealth transfer tax system continues, it will, of course,
contain the important component of the generation skipping transfer
(GST) tax.13 Just as the gift tax was enacted as a backstop to the estate
tax, so the GST tax generally attempts to ensure the taxation of wealth
transfers at least once a generation. The tax first appeared in the 1976
Act but was such a Rube Goldberg invention that Congress scrapped it
in 1986 and enacted the present "simplified" version. I believe that the
administrative problems inherent in the GST system will in time be-
come impossible to handle. Thus, a trust arrangement entered into to-
day may permit discretionary distributions of income to grandchildren
9. See George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161 (1977); Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer
Taxes, 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 1215 (1984).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988).
11. The capital gains tax may reduce Y's estate, yet the remainder of the estate could be
subject to estate taxes as high as 55%. See ABA Section of Taxation, Task Force on Transfer Tax
Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Lawyer 395 (1988), which suggested
that unrealized appreciation be taxed 14 percentage points higher than a top 50% rate. Id. at 446.
The Report suggested alternatively that the estate tax on the non-appreciated assets could be
allowed a credit of 10 percentage points. Id.
12. See Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? at 16 (cited in note 6).
13. 26 U.S.C. ch. 13 (1988).
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with the ultimate termination to grandchildren or great-grandchildren.
For GST purposes the taxable distributions and taxable termination
may take place many years from now.14 What kind of audit trail or tick-
ler file will the IRS maintain to ensure that an individual trustee or
successor trustee will follow the technical requirements of the original
document?' In large metropolitan areas the sophisticated trust officer
may be relied on to keep records for many years, but what about trust-
ees who are relatives, business associates, or family members, and their
successors? And what about banks in smaller communities with one or
two trust officers? It seems unlikely that the GST tax is going to work
in an even-handed way.
5. The transfer tax system often is touted as having the social engi-
neering objective of breaking up concentrated accumulations of wealth.
There is doubt that a transfer tax accomplishes this goal; moreover, a
well-designed comprehensive income tax would better accomplish the
objective.'
C. Policy Considerations for an Accretion System: Taxing Gains at
Gift or Death and Repealing Section 102
A comprehensive income tax is one in which all income is taxed, all
income is taxed to those who earn it, and all income is taxed when it is
earned. Such a comprehensive system would provide maximum fairness
and equity and would be in accordance with recognized Haig-Simons
principles. 17 This system would require taxpayers to conform as nearly
as possible to accrual accounting and to mark-to-market assets each
14. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2621, 2622 (1988).
15. Thus, suppose that G creates a living trust for his married daughter for life, then to her
children for life, with remainders over to G's great-grandchildren. G files a gift tax return in 1993.
G selects his business associate as trustee, and names his daughter's oldest child as successor trus-
tee and a corporate fiduciary as ultimate successor. Taxable distributions and the final taxable
termination may be many years in the future. Assuming that annual income tax returns are filed
for the trust and the beneficiaries, will such taxable distributions be recognized for GST purposes?
16. As one commentator has noted, "Of all major taxes in developed countries, only income
taxes significantly promote progressivity by taxing those with higher incomes at higher rates. Es-
tate and inheritance taxes, as well as wealth taxes that exist in some countries, might be argued to
be more progressive in theory, but nowhere have these taxes raised more than a tiny proportion of
total revenues." Gene Steuerle, Progressive Income Taxation: A Liberal or Conservative Instru-
ment of Policy?, 52 Tax Notes 113, 113 (1991). During the 1980s the incomes of those in the top
1% of the income distribution grew by 75%; the top 5%, by 45%; the top 20%, by 30%; the lowest
20% declined by 4%. In 1980 the average real income of the top 1% was 61 times the poorest 10%;
in 1990 the income of the top 1% was 117 times the poorest 10%. Joint Economic Comm., 1991
Economic Report of the President, S. Rep. No. 27, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991).
17. Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 61-62 (U. of Chicago, 1938); Robert M.
Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax (Colum-
bia U., 1921).
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year,' 8 probably above some minimum threshold amount.'9 In such a
regime, gains and losses would be recognized annually so that the issue
of gifttime and deathtime recognition of gain or loss would become far
less significant. By similar reasoning Section 102 should be repealed.
Just as one hundred dollars of recognized gain enriches the wealth of a
taxpayer, so also does the receipt of a gift or inheritance of one hundred
dollars; the two transactions should be treated in the same way.20 These
policy changes would at first glance seem difficult to sell to a public
already wary of tax proposals. The opportunities for a broad base with
a very low flat rate or low graduated rates are so significant, however,
that the changes are not only logically defensible in an accretion system
but can be made politically palatable.
D. Practical Considerations
Assume that mandatory accrual accounting or a mark-to-market
system are some years away, but let us adopt Professor Zelenak's rec-
ommendations and my additional suggestions for the repeal of Section
102 and the wealth transfer tax system. In this connection Professor
Zelenak has dealt effectively with issues of administration -determina-
tion of basis and value, grandfathering, the marital exemption, life in-
surance, income in respect of decedents, inter vivos trusts, and other
problem areas. I address here only the issue of a basic exemption, be-
cause such an exemption can create important parameters that will
simplify compliance and administration.
Suppose that gains and losses are recognized at gift or at death,
and suppose further that, in accordance generally with Professor
Zelenak's suggestion, $600,000 worth of assets may "pass through" dur-
ing life or death with non-recognition to the transferor or transferee. In
this regime, in the case of a decedent's estate, the estate representatives
would value the net assets as they do under present rules with a corre-
sponding basis step-up.
Example 1: The estate has various assets with a basis of $400,000
and a value of $500,000 with debts and claims of $200,000, or a net
estate of $300,000. Neither the decedent nor the transferees would rec-
ognize gain or loss. The transferees would take a basis of $500,000 in
the assets received, subject to debts of $200,000.
18. David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1118-19 (1986); Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income Tax
Accounting-A Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market, 67 Taxes 824, 825 (1989).
19. See Charles 0. Galvin, Tax Legislation in the Reagan Era-Movement to or from a Con-
sumption Base?, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. 31 (Autumn 1985) (suggesting a threshold of $250,000
for consumer durables and $100,000 for other investments).
20. Dodge, 91 Harv. L. Rev. at 1184 (cited in note 6).
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Example 2: The estate has various assets with a basis of $400,000
and a value of $700,000 with debts and claims of $600,000, or a net
estate of $100,000. Neither the decedent nor the transferees would rec-
ognize gain or loss. If the debts are paid, the transferees would receive
assets with a basis of $100,000.
Example 3: The estate has various assets with a basis of $400,000
and a value of $700,000 with debts and claims of $40,000, or a net estate
of $660,000. The estate representatives would recognize gain in the de-
cedent's last income tax return of $60,000, and establish a basis of
$700,000. Assume that the representatives pay off the debts and trans-
fer $660,000 to the estate beneficiaries. The beneficiaries would report
$60,000 of income and claim a basis in the assets received of $660,000.
I believe that the treatment discussed above is eminently fair in an
accretion-type income tax system. Nor am I concerned about generation
skipping. In Example 3, whether Grandparent leaves the net $660,000
to grandchildren or great-grandchildren, the results to the transferor's
estate and to the transferees should be the same. In the case of lifetime
gifts, the above examples would apply; further, some minimum annual
exclusion-perhaps $10,000-would seem appropriate in addition to the
$600,000 non-recognition threshold.
I have used a non-recognition pass through of $600,000, whether
used during life or at death or partially during life and at death, and a
gifttime annual exclusion of $10,000, because these are thresholds pres-
ently used in estate planning. The number of taxpayers affected by
these thresholds would be manageable-probably between one million
and two million filers in any taxable year.21 Quite obviously, if the
transfer tax system were eliminated, if gifttime and deathtime transfers
triggered gain or loss recognition above the threshold, and if Section
102 were repealed for amounts in excess of the threshold, these changes
would require a whole new set of revenue projections, which might re-
sult in different thresholds. It is fair to assume nonetheless that the net
revenue gains would be significant.
E. Policy Considerations for a Consumed Income System
There is a growing interest in substituting a consumed income-or
cash flow-tax for the present accretion system.22 Broadly stated, tax-
21. Internal Revenue Service statistics give some idea of the numbers involved. Estate tax
returns reporting gross estates in excess of $600,000 filed in 1988 numbered 90,949; in 1989, 45,695;
and in 1990, 50,367. Of the 50,367 returns filed in 1990, only 23,104, or about 46%, reported an
estate tax after credits in the aggregate amount of about $9 billion.
22. See Charles 0. Galvin, What Lies Ahead? Speculations on Tax Reform for the Twenty
First Century, The Vanderbilt Lawyer 4 (Spring 1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a
Hybrid Income-Comsumption Tax, 70 Tex L. Rev. 1145 (1992); David F. Bradford and the U.S.
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payers in such a system would include in income all receipts, and would
deduct all investments placed in a qualified account. The qualified ac-
count would shelter not only the investments placed in it but all income
accruing to those investments, functioning as an unlimited IRA. As
funds are removed from the qualified account for consumption, they
would be subject to tax; a transfer of wealth out of the qualified account
at gifttime or deathtime would be treated as an exercise of consumption
choice by the transferor. The transferee would treat the gift or bequest
as taxable income, subject, of course, to the right of the transferee to
obtain an offsetting deduction by placing the property received in the
transferee's qualified account.
Thus, for example, if Dad gives or bequeaths to Daughter one mil-
lion dollars in stock held in Dad's qualified account, Dad's income tax
base in the year of gift or death would reflect one million dollars in
consumed income. To avoid bunching of the income in one year, Dad or
Dad's estate would be entitled to some form of averaging. Daughter
would include in her income the amount received, which she could off-
set by a deduction for whatever portion of the stock Daughter places in
her qualified account.
The problems of compliance and administration would seem to be
no greater than those under an accretion system.
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Zelenak has contributed significantly to the ongoing dis-
cussion concerning gain or loss recognition at gifttime or deathtime. A
critical analysis and reassessment of either a desirable accretion system,
a consumed income system, or some hybrid of both should move
lawmakers to serious consideration of Professor Zelenak's proposal.
There is reason to hope that discussion of the issues will continue.
Treasury Tax Policy Staff, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 8, 101 (Tax Analysts, 2d ed. 1984);
Alvin Warren, Jr., Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L. J. 1081
(1980); William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 1113 (1974).
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